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Abstract: The monist or dualist character of the executive, a character determined by 
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parliamentary regime, in which case the government is still at “the center of attention” but from 
a different perspective. 
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Introduction 
The appearance of the parliamentary regime determined the need for a second organ of 
executive power1, namely Govern, who is politically liable in front of the parliament, unlike the 
head of the state - be it monarch or president - who is irresponsible from this point of view. Thus, 
in regard to structure, we can distinguish between the monocratic or monist 2 executive and the 
dualist or bicephalous3 or bifurcate4 executive. 
The monist parliamentary regime was specific to the classical from and considered “the 
double necessity of the cabinet to have the trust of the parliament and the head of the state” 
because, in essence, the classic parliamentary regime meant the powers were separated. This was 
translated by the constant collaboration between the head of the state and the parliament through 
the government. Unlike the monocratic system, the dualist one, specific to modern parliamentary 
regime meant the government had the Parliament’s trust5. 
 
Monocratic executive 
Doctrine6  appreciates that the executive is monocratic or monist when the executive 
function is entrusted to a single state entity. It is also stated7 that this form of the executive can 
be seen when the decision is focused in the hands of a single organism. Thus, we can talk about a 
monocratic or monist executive when a single public authority of the state exercises executive 
power. 
                                                
1
  T. Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. II, “Lumina Lex” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2000, p. 308. 
2
 See I. Vida, Puterea executivă şi administraţia publică, Regia Autonomă “Monitorul Oficial” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 1994, p. 31 and following. 
3
 See A. Hauriou, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, “Montchrestien” Publishing House, Paris, 1972, p. 
653. 
4
 T. Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. II, “Lumina Lex” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2000, p. 308. 
5
 See A. Hauriou, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, “Montchrestien” Publishing House, Paris, 1972, p. 
209. 
6
 I. Vida, Puterea executivă şi administraţia publică, Regia Autonomă  “Monitorul Oficial” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 1994, p. 31. 
7
 D.C. Dănişor, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Exerciţiul puterii în stat, vol. II, “Europa” Publishing 
House, Craiova, 1996, p. 99. 
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Starting from this statement, we can see that such an executive structure was specific to 
absolute monarchies where there was no separation of powers. Thus, the one who had power, 
namely the monarch, regardless of the title - king, lord, emperor, prince, emir and so on 
exercised power in al its aspects, passing laws, administering and acting as a judge. The advisers, 
ministers8 or workers who assisted the monarch were not all a part of a collegial body similar to 
the present government as they were not considered to be a distinctive authority in the state with 
own duties and prerogatives. On the other hand, their role was that of advising the monarch, 
sometimes even discussing his orders and dispositions. The word “monarchy” represents the 
from of organization, of governing of a state in which “executive power is entrusted...to a single 
person”9; the origin of this word is Greek, as “monos” means “alone” and “arhi” - “reign”. 
As is the case of absolute monarchies, in case of dictatorship regimes, the mixing of 
powers has determined that the power holder, thus the holder of executive power, to be one 
organism, be it unipersonal or collegial. 
In regard to these mentions and starting from the assumption that all current monarchies 
are thought to have a more symbolic character, we feel that it is necessary to state if 
parliamentary monarchies, especially those from the European continent, still have a monocratic 
executive or if it was replaced by the dualist executive or if it became more particular. 
In the United Kingdom, the symbolic character of the monarchy is maybe the most 
visible, as, at least in theory, the holder of executive power is the monarch; in practice “her 
majesty’s ministers” are the ones who exercise power, led by the prime-minister who will answer 
to the Parliament 10 ; however, there are constitutional regulations of other states, such as 
Denmark, Holland, Belgium, countries which can impose contrary opinions. 
Thus, for example, section 12 of Denmark’s Constitution11 clearly states that the King, 
with limitations stated by the Constitution, has supreme authority in regard to all the kingdom’s 
affairs and will exercise supreme authority through ministers who are, according to section 14, 
named and revoked by the monarch, including the prime-minister. All their tasks will be 
established by the monarch. Sections 17 and 18 of the same legal act regulate two organisms, the 
State Council formed of the ministers - holders of ministerial bodies, the Heir to the Throne ruled 
on by the King and the Minister’s Council, who is formed of the ministers and presided by the 
prime-minster. The Distinction between these two organisms is not only in regard to their 
component and the person who presides it as section 17 alignment (2) corroborated with section 
18 establishes a rule of priority for the State Council, namely all projects of law and all important 
government measures will be discussed by the council only if the King was prevented from 
calling de State Council, thus subjecting these to the debate of the Minister’s Council. 
Furthermore, the same section 18 states that, after the Minister’s Council reaches a decision, the 
prime-minster is obliged to inform the king who will decide whether to embrace the 
recommendations of the Minister’s Council or to bring that specific problem to the attention of 
the State’s Council. Unlike the Danish constitutional regulations, the Dutch ones stated that the 
King is part of the Government, along with the ministers [article 42 alignment (1)]. However, 
according to the provisions of article 45 alignments (1) - (3) the ministers along with the prime-
minister from the Council of Ministers, who is presided by the prime-minister, the person who 
decides on governmental policy and who will ensure and promote its coherence. However, in the 
Dutch constitutional system, according to article 43, the prime-minister and the ministers are 
named and revoked by the king, through regal decree.  
                                                
8
 The term “minster” is used to designate the advisers of the monarch. This word no longer has the same 
significance nowadays, that of dutiful, servant.  
9
 P. Negulescu, Curs de drept constituţional român, published by Alex. Th. Doicescu, Bucharest, 1928, p. 413. 
10
 Also see Elena Simina Tănăsescu, N. Pavel (coordinators), Actele constituţionale ale Regatului Unit al Marii 
Britanii şi Irlandei de Nord, in the Collection “Constitutions of the States of the World, All Beck Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2003, pp. 5 and following. 
11
 Similar provisions to those of the Danish Constitution are found in the Norwegian Constitution. See the provisions 
of articles 12-13.  
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In regard to these two constitutional examples, we will point out that the Danish 
executive, by the fact that it provides the monarch a considerable power of decision which is not 
to be found in the provisions of Holland’s Constitution, is significantly closer to the real 
monocratic executive. On the contrary, the Dutch executive can only formally be monocratic, as 
it seems to be more a dualist executive, as is the case of most contemporary monarchies, in our 
opinion.  
The evolution from absolute monarchy to parliamentary monarchy or contemporary 
republics, as well as the influence of the principle of separation and equilibrium of powers in the 
state will determine, most times, the abandonment of the monocratic executive in favor of the 
dualist one. 
Given all these, the monocratic executive model was assumed by states with a 
presidential regime, where the holder of the executive power is the president of the republic. The 
most eloquent example is that of the president of the United States of America12 who, by the 
provisions of article 2 paragraph 1 point 1 of the Constitution, is granted all executive power. 
The American presidential regime overstepped the boundaries of the state where the 1787 
Constitution was born, but each of the states 13  that used it as a model, brought upon an 
“institutional innovation”14, namely the Government, who along with the President - head of the 
state, form executive power. This “alteration” of the presidential regime did not affect the nature 
of the regime, an aspect pointed out by doctrine 15  and by the constitutional regulations, 
especially those regarding the functions and attributions of the President. 
 
The dualist executive 
Unlike the monocratic executive, the dualist one entails the exercising of executive power 
by two distinctive bodies, one of those being unipersonal - the head of the state - and usually 
called de president and the other a collegial body with specific attributions, by name of 
government - the most common and used name, ministerial cabinet or minister’s council. 
The appearance of the dualist executive was determined, as we have mentioned 
previously, by the appearance and spreading of the of the parliamentary regime, in which the 
constant collaboration of powers, of the head of state with the parliament, called for the creation 
of this organ who, initially, was supposed to benefit from the trust of the head of state, as well as 
the parliament. 
The evolution in time of the parliamentary regime will force the collegial body to only 
benefit from the confidence of the parliament. On the other hand, this evolution will determine 
several particularities for each state, sometimes even within the same state, particularities 
regarding the parliamentary regime and the executive in general, with priority given to the 
collegial body. 
                                                
12
 We must point out that although the United States’ Constitution did not regulated a collegial body to exercise 
executive power along with the President, some presidents, like Alexander Hamilton or Thomas Jefferson tried to 
reunite the leaders of the federal executive departments in order to easily coordinate them. Their existence is stated 
by article 2 paragraph 2 point 1 of the Constitution. Their attempt failed as it was later pointed out by the political-
constitutional American reality. For details – see J.Q. Wilson, American Government. Institutions and Policies, 
Harvard University and University of California, Los Angeles, 1986, p. 330. 
13
 Such examples are Argentina or the Russian Federation. In both cases, although executive power is entrusted to 
the president, the constitutional regulation of a collegial body – the Government – an exponent of the executive, 
makes us think that is an exaggeration to describe these systems as moncratic, at least on a formal level. The 
executive was dualist and the President had a favorable position. See I. Vida, Puterea executivă şi administraţia 
publică, Regia Autonomă “Monitorul Oficial” Publishing House, Bucharest, 1994, p. 34; J. P. Jacqué, Droit 
constitutionnel et institutions politiques, “Dalloz” Publishing House, Paris, 2003; V. Duculescu, Constanţa Călinoiu, 
G. Duculescu, Constituţia României - comentată şi adnotată, “Lumina Lex” Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997, pp. 
572, 580-586. 
14
 I. Vida, Puterea executivă şi administraţia publică, Regia Autonomă “Monitorul Oficial” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 1994, p. 34. 
15
 Ibidem. 
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In regard to the reports within the dualist executive system, we can notice that in these 
modern parliamentary regimes, the role of the head of the state - president or monarch - is 
increasingly similar to the symbolic role of the monarch, as the task of exercising the executive 
power is given to the government. 
A particular situation is seen in case of semi presidential or parliamentary republics, as 
they are characterized by part of the doctrine. Especially the relations between the president and 
the prime minister will be significantly influenced by the evolution of the political scene, but 
also by the personality of those who temporarily hold these dignities. Thus, although 
constitutional lawmakers who chose to organize the powers of a state by following the rules of a 
such a regime as the French one, have reconfigured the role of the president, by letting go of his 
symbolic character; there was no transformation of the president in the head of the executive 
power and the elimination of the prime-minister or his transformation in a “puppet” of the first 
one. So, even though we can appreciate that the source of inspiration of the institution of 
president of the state is the Orleans16 parliamentary regime, we can’t say that the institution of 
the president is a copy of it. We must also point out that one of the aspects which bring it close to 
the Orleans parliamentary regime is that of giving significant attributions to the president, even 
own attributions (like the one to dissolve the legislative or one of the rooms of the legislative, the 
right to exercise some attributions and elaborate decrees without the signature of the prime-
minister) without benefiting from theoretical rights which are, in fact, exercised by the 
responsible ministers. We can even state that in a semi presidential regime, the president doesn’t 
have the effective power to govern, as he is not a substitute for the government or the prime 
minister. His role is strictly centered on the quality of referee17, a statement which is all the more 
correct in case of semi presidential regimes in an extenuating from or in case of semi 
parliamentary regimes, as it is out current constitutional regime. 
The relations between the president and the government, namely the prime-minister, 
within a semi presidential regime are of collaboration similar with those of a parliamentary 
regime. However, these relations can suffer in a semi presidential regime when the president is 
not also the chief of parliamentary majority, as he is forced “to coexist” with it, but most of all, 
with its leader - the prime-minister, in which case none of his constitutional duties allow him “to 
paralyze the activity of the government or the parliament”18, by allowing him to exercise his veto 
rights when there is a joint decision19 to be made by him and the prime-minster. In these times, 
we can talk about the functioning of a “cabinet government” similar to the British one, by 
mentioning that the prerogatives of the president are not merely symbolic, as representation of 
the honorific presiding of some state organisms. 
                                                
16
 The Orleans parliamentary regime represented an intermediary phase between limited monarchy and modern 
parliamentary regimes and appeared in France when the Chart of 1830 was applied as interpreted by King Louis-
Philippe off the dynasty d’ Orleans (hence the name of this regime). This involved the existence of a dualist 
executive in which the head of the state had important powers, but was separate from the collegial Government, who 
was liable to the Parliament. The constitutional reform of 1962 even if inspired from this from of parliamentary 
regime „deformed” it not towards a presidential regime, but towards parliamentary one. See M. Duverger, Les 
constitutions de la France, „P.U.F.” Publishing House, Paris, 1987, pp. 63-65, 106-107. 
17
 M. Duverger, Les constitutions de la France, „P.U.F.” Publishing House, Paris, 1987, pp. 106-107. 
18
 Idem, p. 117. 
19
 Such duties can be found in the French Constitution or even in the Portuguese one. We mention duties like: 
signing ordinances and decrees of the Minister’s Council (French Constitution – art. 13 alignment 1), the passing of 
laws, law-decrees, regulatory decrees, signing the resolutions of the Republic’s Assembly of acknowledging 
international agreements, as well as other Government’s Decrees (Portuguese Constitution – art. 137 letter b) or the 
possibility of the President to organize a referendum by request of the Government, any law regarding the domains 
stated in article 11 alignment (1) of the French Constitution, namely relevant national issues which must be subject 
of referendum under the conditions stated by article 137 letter c) corroborated with article 118 of the Portuguese 
Constitution. The possibility of exercising the veto right by the President, in both examples, is translated by his 
refusal to act according to the constitution. 
O. Şaramet 
 
 
We can’t ignore the fact that even within the government, there is a tendency of growth20 
of the prime minister’s role in the detriment of the other ministers, given that the majority of 
constitutions21, in order “to avoid the risk of an authoritarian prime minister to replace a minister 
by imposing a certain political trace and not the political line of the program which is accepted 
by the parliament”22, states that he coordinates the activity of the ministers, by respecting the 
specific attributions of each and every one of them. However, the prime minister’s attempt to 
turn his primus inter pares positions from the government to that of primus inter partes is more 
and more visible. 
 
The evolution of the executive’s structure in Romania 
The regulations of the Developing Statute of the 7/19 august 1958 Convention, especially 
those of article I corroborated with those of articles II, III and V, according to which The Lord 
was entrusted will all public powers, while the legislative power was exercised by the Lord 
together with the two Legislative Assemblies, describe a monocratic or monist executive. 
Subsequently, by passing the 1866 Constitution, the parliamentary regime 23  was 
introduced, as well as monarchy as a form of government. In regard of the structure, the 
Constitution itself provides a clue, by stating in article 35 the fact that executive power is 
entrusted to the King who will exercise it by its own regulations. Thus, we are in the presence of 
a monocratic or monist executive system, the unipersonal body which was entrusted with 
exercising this power being originally called “the Lord”, while, later on, following the 1881 
proclamation of the Kingdom of Romania, it became known as “The King”. 
The 1923 Constitution will maintain, among other previous constitutional regulations, the 
provisions of article 36 of the 1866 Constitution, which are to be found in article 39. As opposed 
to this, this fundamental law will set out the Government by pointing out, in article 92, that the 
Government exercises legislative power in name of the King in the way established by the 
Constitution. This attention given by the lawmaker to the Government or Minister’s Council did 
not transform the Romanian executive of that time from a monocratic one to a dualist one24. The 
same point of view is found in inter war doctrine25 and it is based on the fact that the rule was to 
entrust executive power to one organism which was unipersonal26, but also on the fact that the 
holder of sovereignty - the nation - by organizing the way sovereignty was about to be exercised, 
                                                
20
 Such an example is the Lithuanian Constitution (passed by the Lithuanian legislative on October 25th, 1992, 
acknowledged by the President of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania 15 days since it was passed by 
referendum) which, in article 96, states that the ministers lead „the spheres” of administration which were entrusted 
to them, but they are under the direct supervision of the prime-minister. 
21
 Thus, article 65 of the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany states that the political guidelines 
are set by the Federal Chancellor and each federal minister leads his own department independently and responsibly. 
A similar provision can be found in the Slovenian Constitution (this constitution was passed on December 23rd, 
1991, being subsequently revised three times, in 1997, 2000 and 2003), thus, article 114 alignment (1) mentions that 
he president of the Government is responsible for ensuring the unity of political and administrative leadership of the 
Government by coordinating the activity of the ministers.  
22
 M. Constantinescu, A. Iorgovan, I. Muraru, Simina Elena Tănăsescu, Constituţia României revizuită – comentarii 
şi explicaţii, „All Beck” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, p. 181. 
23
 C. Ionescu, Tratat de drept constituţional contemporan, „All Beck” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p. 491 
24
 According to a contrary opinion, executive power was exercised by the Government in the name of the King. The 
Government held the real decision-making power through the prime-minister. C. Ionescu, Contemporary 
constitutional law treaty, op. cit., page 509. An argument in favor of this statement could be that although the King 
had the right to legislative initiative, King Ferdinand never exercised this right, as the government was the one that 
elaborated projects of law which ere then presented to the king through a Journal of the Minister’s Council. 
Acknowledging a formal monocratic executive doesn’t seem plausible for those times, especially since, at that time 
in history, Europe’s monarchs play a significant role in history. 
25
 See P. Negulescu, Curs de drept constituţional român, published by Alex. Th. Doicescu, Bucharest, 1928, pp. 413 
and following. 
26
 Exceptions from this rule: the French Directorate of the 1875 Constitution, The Swiss Federal Council regulated 
by the 1874 Swiss Constitution, the regal lieutenancy, regency and the Minister’s Council, regulated by article 81 of 
the Constitution.  
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established by constitution that one of its attributes be exercised by an organ of the state, called 
The King27.  
Thus, it was pointed out that executive power is not the property of the person who 
exercises it, a valid statement in our opinion, regardless of whether the executive is a monocratic 
one or a dualist one. The way executive power will be exercised is established by constitutional 
regulations. 
The 1938 Constitution will maintain a monocratic executive, as the executive power was 
entrusted to the King, a unipersonal body, which, according to article 32, will exercise it by its 
own Government. 
By the passing of constitutional law of September 194028, the new regulations abolished 
the dictatorship of King Carol the Second, but this will not affect the structure of the Romanian 
executive, as it will still be a monocratic one regardless of whether it is the new king or the Field 
Marshall Ion Antonescu who will exercise executive power. 
Thus, the prerogatives of the new King - Mihai the First, will be reduced until he will 
only hold honorary titles as: head of the armed forces, awarding decorations29, as all the other 
powers of the state were entrusted to the Minister’s Council, which had “full powers to lead the 
State”30 thus becoming the “pivot of the entire Romanian public life”31. 
The time between 1944 and 1948 was marked by numerous social -political controversies 
and constitutional transformations. This will all put a serious mark on the executive’s structure 
making it the more difficult to appreciate the monist or dualist character of the executive, even if 
by Decree no 1626 of August 31st, 1944, the provisions of the 1923 Constitution will be partly 
reinstated. Our point of view is based on the fact that although monarchy is maintained, the 
Minister’s Council is transformed into “a supreme organ of the state, which had all state 
power”32. Subsequently, by Law no. 363 of December 30th, 1947 for the forming of the popular 
republic or Romania33, the task of exercising executive power will be granted to a collegial body 
- The Presidium of the People’s Republic of Romania - which will have the Government as a 
subordinate. Thus, the executive can be qualified as being a monist one. 
The following Romanian Constitutions, namely those of 1948 and 1952 establish a 
monist executive, represented by a collegial body, namely the Presidium of the National 
Legislative Assembly 34 , the Government or the Minister’s Council, who only performed 
administrative duties. 
                                                
27
 See P. Negulescu, Curs de drept constituţional român, published by Alex. Th. Doicescu, Bucharest, 1928,  
p. 415. 
28
 Royal Decree no 3051 of September 5th, 1940 published in the Official Gazette of Romania, part I, no 205 of 
September 5th, 1940; Royal Decree no 3052 of September 5th, 1940 published in the Official Gazette of Romania, 
part I, no 205 of September 5th, 1940; Royal Decree no 3053 of September 5th, 1940 published in the Official 
Gazette of Romania, part I, no 205 of September 5th, 1940; Royal Decree no 3064 of September 6th, 1940 published 
in the Official Gazette of Romania, part I, no 206 bis of September 6th, 1940; Royal Decree no 3067 of September 
6th, 1940 published in the Official Gazette of Romania, part I, no 206 bis of September 6th, 1940; Royal Decree no 
3072 of September 8th, 1940. 
29
 P. Negulescu, G. Alexianu, Tratat de drept public, Tomul I, „Casa Şcoalelor” Publishing House, 1942, p. 232 
30
 Ibidem. 
31
 Ibidem. Current doctrine states the fact that in passing governing acts - law-decrees - the Field Marshall Ion 
Antonescu associated with King Mihai (See C. Ionescu, Tratat de drept constituţional contemporan, „All Beck” 
Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p. 518). However, the executive is dualist only in appearance as “the 
fundamental principle is that or leading, of an authoritarian leadership exercised by a single person - the Head of the 
State” (P. Negulescu, G. Alexianu, Tratat de drept public, Tomul I, “Casa Şcoalelor” Publishing House, 1942, p. 
236). 
32
 I. Muraru, Simina Elena Tănăsescu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, “All Beck” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2001, p. 110. 
33
 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania, part I, no. 300 bis of December 30th, 1947. 
34
 Neither of these laws state, expresis verbis, those stated above, the only explanation refers to the abolition of the 
principle if separation of powers in state and the equilibrium of powers in state and the replacing of this principle 
with that of the confusion of powers. However, the logical and systematic interpretation of the constitutional 
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The constitutional development of Romania after the events of 16-22nd December 1989 
can be characterized by three stages: the stage of revolutionary power, the stage of revolutionary 
powers organized under from of the Legislative Assembly and the stage of legalizing the 
Revolution.  
By the National Salvation’s Front statement, published in the Romanian Official Gazette 
no 1 of December 22nd, 1989, the only central organs which were maintained were the ministries. 
By concentrating all legislative power in the hands of one collegial body that came from the 
Council of the National Salvation Front, the governing of the country was equivalent to “a 
factual governing performed by a group of people who undertook this responsibility all by 
themselves and acted according to the specific needs of those times”35. Because of this, it is 
nearly impossible to distinguish between organisms and state authorities in the sense of the 
separation of power theory, especially since the dualist of monist character of the executive can’t 
be established. 
Defined as a “revolutionary mini-constitution”36, the law-decree no. 2 of 1989 regarding 
the forming, organizing and functioning of the National Salvation Front and the territorial 
councils of the National Salvation Front formed a new body - the Council of the National 
Salvation Front, whose president had specific duties similar to those of a head of the state37. The 
same newly created Council will have as a duty, according to the provisions of article 2 
alignment (1) letter b) the naming and revoking of the prime minister. By giving these duties to 
the Council of the National Salvation’s Front, the new regime can be characterized as one “of 
assembly” in which “executive power comes from the legislative power who can revoke it at any 
time”38. As for the structure, the executive is a dualist one, represented by the President of the 
Republic and the Government39; however, placing the Government as a subordinate and granting 
the President the possibility to dissolve the legislative deprives the executive of the possibility to 
keep “its profile and the true power in state”40.  
By the Law-Decree not 92/1990 for choosing the Parliament and the President of 
Romania a new political and judicial institution was created - the President of Romania, who 
exercised executive power along with the Government, headed by the prime-minister. Thus, the 
dualist structure of the executive was confirmed. 
The dualist structure of the executive was maintained by the lawmaker of 1991, as well 
as following the 2003 revision of the Constitution, as a unipersonal body - head of the state and a 
collegial body - the Government. The Government will be supported in exercising its duties by 
the public administration which it will lead. This activity must not be understood in a restrictive 
way which would eventually translate by attributes of command and control as the relations 
between the Government and the pubic administration are those of subordination, collaboration 
                                                                                                                                                       
provisions, as well as appreciating the duties of this Presidium, stated by article 44 of the 1948 Constitution, article 
37 of the 1952 Constitution will allow the support of this statement. 
35
 T. Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. I, „Lumina Lex” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2000, p. 392. 
36
 Ibidem. This Law-Decree was published in the Official Gazette of Romania no 4 of December 27th, 1989. 
37
 According to article 5 of the Law-Decree, the President of the National Salvation Front’s council had specific 
duties similar to those of a head of the state who exercises his function of representation: for example, representing 
the country in international relations, concluding international treaties, naming ambassadors. However, as doctrine 
pointed out, (See T. Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. I, “Lumina Lex” 
Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p 393) the duties are reduced as opposed to those of the president of a 
presidential republic, even a parliamentary one. 
38
 T. Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. I, “Lumina Lex” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2000, pp. 274-276 and p. 393. 
39
 By the Law-decree no 10 of 1989 regarding the forming, organizing and functioning of the Romanian 
Government, a supreme organ of state administration will be formed, namely the Romanian Government. 
40
 T. Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. I, “Lumina Lex” Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2000, p. 276. 
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and administrative tutelage41; the nature of the relations between the Government and authorities 
and organs of the central public administration are identified by the fundamental law42.  
 
Conclusion 
Hence, at present times, identifying an executive as being monocratic, monist or dualist 
can be somewhat difficult, as there are constitutional systems in which it is difficult to appreciate 
an executive as having one form or another. The more or less formal prepotency of the head of 
state - monarch or president - in exercising executive power and its reports to the collegial body - 
the other component of the executive, these all influence these identification. 
On the other hand, to describe an executive as being monocratic does not mean that the 
body, the authority who exercises executive power is a unipersonal one; it can also be a collegial 
body. In regard to the number of members of the monist collegial executive, there are several 
forms43 : duumvirate44  – the executive is formed of two equal members, triumvirate45  - the 
executive is formed of three people and the diarchy46 - the executive is formed from more than 
two members but it is no longer necessary for them to be on equal positions. 
Within this dualist executive, the nature of the political regime established by the 
Constitution and which is influenced by the parliamentary one, the duties are split between a 
head of the state, represented by the President of the Republic, chose by universal and direct vote 
and a Government named by the President following the trust vote granted by the Parliament, to 
which it is accountable. 
 
                                                
41
 See Dana Apostol Tofan, Drept administrativ, vol. I, “C.H. Beck” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 150; A. 
Iorgovan, Tratat de drept administrativ, vol.I, “All Beck” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 364 
42
 Thus, for example, distinguishing between ministerial administration and extra ministerial one, article 116 of the 
republished Constitution, specifies the existence of subordination relations between the government and the 
ministries or other specialty bolides, as well as collaboration relations with autonomous administrative authorities. 
The same article mentions the existence of similar relations between the first ministries and specialty bodies which 
can be organized; alignments (1) and (2) of article 123 establishes other types of relations between the Government 
and the prefect, as well as the relations between the prefect and public services ad other organs of central public 
administration. However, article 123 alignment (4) will exclude any such relations between the prefect and 
authorities of the local public administration, as the mayor, local council, county council and the president of the 
county council. For the distinction between ministerial administration and extra ministerial administration, also see 
Dana Apostol Tofan, Drept administrativ, vol. I, “C.H. Beck” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 150, or I. Vida, 
Puterea executivă şi administraţia publică, Regia Autonomă “Monitorul Oficial” Publishing House, Bucharest, 
1994, pp. 127-128. 
43
 D. C. Dănişor, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Exerciţiul puterii în stat, vol.II, “Europa” Publishing 
House, Craiova, 1996, pp. 100-101. 
44
 Such an example can be found in the time of the Roman Republic (509 BC. – 27 BC.) when the King’s role in 
leading the state was taken over by two consuls, whose duties will be limited throughout this regime by creating new 
magistracies. Their powers were limited because they were chosen for a year, subsequently becoming simple 
citizens who could be called in front of the people to answer for the acts passed while they were in function. See E. 
Molcuţ, D. Oancea, Drept roman, “Şansa” Publishing House and Univers Publishing House, 1993, p. 31. 
45
 Such a form the monist collegial executive was regulated by the VIIIth year Constitution of France when, 
according to article 39, Bonaparte and Cambacérès were appointed consuls for a period of 5 years. Both of them, but 
especially Bonaparte had all the executive power. See M. Morabito, D. Bourmaud, Histoire constitutionnelle et 
politique de la France (1789-1958), „Montchrestien” Publishing House, Paris, 1996, pp. 133-134. A special form of 
the triumvirate can be seen is Bosnia-Herzegovina where, in an attempt to prevent interracial conflicts, article V 
stated that the presidency of this state must be formed of three members: a Croatian one and a Bosnian one, both 
chosen from the Federal territory and a Serbian one chosen from the territory of the Serbian Republic. This collegial 
body is close, in structure, to the Swiss one because, according to article V paragraph 2 letter b) of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s constitution, the three members of the presidency will name one as the President. The one who 
received the largest number of votes was chosen for the first time; subsequently they all took turns or were chosen 
by the Parliamentary Assembly. 
46
 The French constitution of year III (of August 22nd, 1795) entrusted executive power to a Directorate – a collegial 
body formed of 5 directors who were chosen by the legislative bodies. M. Morabito, D. Bourmaud, Histoire 
constitutionnelle et politique de la France (1789-1958), „Montchrestien” Publishing House, Paris, 1996, pp. 113 and 
following. 
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